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ESTATE PLANNING AND POWERS
OF APPOINTMENT
CHARLEs L. B. LOWNDES*
One of the significant developments in the area of tax and estate
planning is the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951,1 which was enacted
on June 28, 1951, in an effort to find a just and permanent solution for
the taxation of powers ofappointment under the federal estate and gift
taxes. The new law &deserves careful scrutiny not only by the tax spe-
cialist, but by every lawyer who is interested in drafting wills and trusts
or planning estates.2 Powers of appointment in the broad sense in which
that expression is used in the Powers of Appointment Act are one of the
most valuable tools which the estate planner has; and the new law, which
adopts a much more relaxed attitude toward the taxation of such powers
than some of the earlier legislation, offers opportunities for tax econo-
mies which one can ill afford to overlook. Before passing to the taxation
of powers of appointment, however, it may be helpful to look briefly at
what the tax law means by a power of appointment.
Powers of Appointment
In some respects a power of appointment is defined more broadly
under tax law than it is under property law, and in some respects it is
defined more narrowly. 3 For purposes of the federal estate and gift
taxes, a power of appointment means any power to dispose of property
which the holder of the power does not own, as long as the holder of
the power received the power from someone else; that is, as long as the
power is a "donated" power as distinguished from a "reserved" power.
Thus, if A leaves property to T in trust to pay the income from the
property to C for life, and at C's death to distribute the property to
whomsoever C designates by his will, C has a power of appointment.
However, as far as the federal estate and gift taxes are concerned, C
would also have a power of appointment, if he were given power to with-
draw principal from the trust, or to terminate the trust and compel the
trustee to convey the trust property to C or to someone else. Moreover,
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
' Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951) amending §§811 (f) and
1000(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
'For discussions of the new law see: Turk, Powers of Appointment, 90 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 428 (July 1951) ; Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HAmv.
L. REy. 55 (November 1951) ; Lucas, Taxation of Powers of Appointment under
the New Law, 31 TRUST BULLETIN 26 (December 1951) ; Johnson, Powers of Ap-
pointment, 29 TAXES 965 (December 1951).
'For the property law definition of a power of appointment see, RESTATEmENT,
PROPERTY §318 (1940) ; Snvm~s, FUTURE INTERESTS 168 (1951).
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any powers'given to the trustee to affect the beneficial enjoyment of the
trust, like a power to invade principal on behalf of the income benefi-
ciaries of the trust, or to terminate the trust, are treated as powers of
appointment for tax purposes. Thus as far as the federal estate and gift
taxes are concerned, any power by which the holder of the power can
dispose of property which he does not own is treated as a power of ap-
pointment, as long as it is a 'donated power.
Reserved powers, that is, powers to appoint property which are
retained by the owner of the property in connection with a conveyance
of the property, are not treated as powers of appointment for tax pur-
poses, but as "strings" upon the property transferred which make the
transfer itself taxable to the estate of the transferor.4 The practical
importance of the distinction between donated and reserved powers is
that a reserved power may result in a tax, where a donated power would
not be taxable. For example, if A conveys property to T in trust to pay
the income from the property to C during C's life and at C's death to
distribute the property among the children of C as A shall appoint, and
in default of appointment to divide the property among C's children
equally, the remainder after C's life estate will be taxed to A's estate
under the federal estate tax. It will not be taxed upon the theory that
A had a power of appointment, because his power is a special power
which is not taxable. But it will be taxed upon the theory that A kept
a "string" on the property which makes the transfer of the property
taxable to his estate as a transfer which he could alter or amend.5
Tax lawyers use the same terminology as property lawyers in desig-
nating the parties to a power of appointment. Thus, the person who
creates the power is called the donor of the power. The person to whom
the power is given is known as the donee of the power. The person to
whom the property is appointed is called the appointee; and the person
who takes the property in default of appointment is known as the taker
in default of appointment. For example, suppose that A leaves Black-
acre to B for life with a power to appoint the remainder in the property
by his will, with remainder in default of appointment to C and his heirs,
and that B appoints the property to X. A is the donor of the power.
B is the donee. X is the appointee. C is the taker in default of ap-
pointment.
Powers of appointment are ordinarily divided into general and special
powers. Under property law, a general power means a power to appoint
property to any one in the world, although there is a recent tendency to
call a power under which the donee can appoint the property to himself
'InT. Rrv. CODE §§811 (C) and 811(d).
'INT. REV. CODE §811(d); Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of New York,
82 F. 2d 157 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 552 (1936).
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a general power, even though his choice of appointees is not unlimited.6
A special power is a power to appoint to a restricted class of persons. 7
The tax distinction between general and special powers is somewhat more
complex ant will require more detailed examination.
Since a power of appointment is a power to dispose of property which
the donee does not own, title passes from the donor of the power to the
appointee, when the power is exercised, rather than from the donee to
the appointee. If the power is not exercised, the taker in default ac-
quires title from the donor of the power rather than the donee.8 Per-
haps the most graphic analogy to illustrate the common law operation
of a power of appointment is what happens when a grantor of property
makes a deed to the property with the grantee's name left blank and
gives this to an agent with authority to fill in the name of the grantee
and deliver the deed. When the agent fills in the name of the grantee
and delivers the deed, title to the property passes from the grantor to the
grantee, rather than from the agent to the grantee, because the agent has
not transferred property which he owned; he has simply completed the
original grant. A power of appointment operates in the same way.
When the donee exercises the power and appoints the property he simply
completes the transfer of the property from the donor of the power to
the donee. The donee does not make a conveyance of his own property.
Estate Planning and Powers of Appointment
Powers of appointment are valuable in planning an estate because
they give flexibility to an estate plan which makes it possible to accom-
modate the dispositive provisions of the plan to changes in circumstances.
Illustrations of the use of powers of appointment in planning an estate
could be multiplied almost indefinitely. Without attempting any detailed
analysis of the role which powers of appointment play in planning an
estate, consider several elementary examples which illustrate the value
of powers of appointment in connection with a typical family settlement.
Frequently a man will leave his property in trust for his widow for
life with remainders to his children. The principal vice of this type of
disposition is its rigidity. If the income from the property proves inade-
quate for the widow's support, there is no way in which she can reach
the principal. Moreover, the distribution of the remainder among the
children will have to be determined at the husband's death. When the
widow dies some of the children may have prospered mightily and have
no need for the property. Others may have encountered misfortune and
need more than their proportionate shares. Ordinarily a better method
of disposing of the property will be to give the widow a power to with-
draw any principal which she may need for her support during her life,
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §320(1) (1940).
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §320(2) (1940).
' SIMES, FUTURE INwrEsTs 178-181 (1951).
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with a further power to appoint the remainder among the children by
her will. By the judicious use of powers of appointment a family settle-
ment can be made sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the family as
they develop, rather than frozen in a rigid mold which cannot be adapted
to changing conditions.
Another common situation where it is desirable to use powers of ap-
pointment occurs where a man leaves property in trust to a son for life,
with remainders over to the son's children. This type of rigid settlement
has another serious defect in addition to those which exist where prop-
erty is left to a widow for life with remainders to children. Not only
will the son be unable to reach any principal which he may need to sup-
port himself and his family during his life and to make a proper disposi-
tion of the property among his children at his 'death, but if his only
estate consists of his interest in the trust fund, he will not be able to
provide for his widow after his death. The son should be given power
to withdraw whatever principal he needs for his support and that of his
family during his life, and a power to appoint the remainder in the
property among his children at death. In addition, he should be given
power to appoint income or principal from the trust to his widow to take
care of her after his death.
It probably is not an overstatement to say that any family settlement
where property is tied up for a protracted period is presumptively de-
fective unless it includes one or more powers of appointment. Even
where the beneficiary of the estate is an incompetent who cannot be
entrusted with a power of appointment, the possibility of giving powers
to the trustee or some disinterested person should be carefully considered.
In dealing with powers of appointment it is important to consider
their tax consequences. The Powers of Appointment Act of 19510 was
expressly designed to encourage the use of powers of appointment. Con-
sequently, it creates a sizeable area of tax-free powers, and it also con-
tains a number of provisions for avoiding taxes on existing powers. A
particular power of appointment should not be selected solely because it
is not taxable. However, it will frequently happen that a non-taxable
power will serve to reach a desired end equally as well as a taxable
power. There are, moreover, cases where taxes in connection with
existing powers can be minimized without the sacrifice of substantial ad-
vantages. The possible economies in connection with powers of appoint-
ment may be explored more intelligently after a consideration of how
powers of appointment are taxed. Under the recent relaxation of the
taxes on powers of appointment imposed by the federal estate and gift
taxes, however, it would appear that there are very few situations where
the purposes of an estate plan cannot be served as well by non-taxable
' Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951).
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as taxable powers. One obvious exception, of course, is a marital deduc-
tion trust, where it is necessary to employ a taxable power to qualify the
trust for the deduction.'0 Apart from the marital deduction trust, how-
ever, it will seldom be necessary to employ a taxable power.-"
Taxation of Powers of Appointment
Including the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951,12 the taxation of
powers of appointment has gone through four stages. In order to get
some perspective on the new Act, it will be helpful to review the earlier
law.
A. The Prior Law
The first federal estate tax enacted in 191613 made no explicit provi-
sion for taxing powers of appointment. In United States v. Field,'_4
the Supreme Court held that property subject to a power of appointment
was not taxable to the estate of the donee of the power, even where the
power was a general power which the donee exercised by his will. The
Court said that the property did not belong to the donee and was not
distributable as part of his estate.
The 1918 Act'15 provided for a tax on powers of appointment, and
the provisions of the 1918 Act upon this point remained substantially
unchanged until the 1942 Act.16 The tax imposed upon powers of
appointment under the 1918 Act was restricted very narrowly. Con-
gress limited the tax to property passing under the exercise of a general
power of appointment by will or by a transfer in contemplation of, or
taking effect, at death. In Helvering v. Grinnell,17 the Supreme Court
held that a power of appointment was not taxable even though it was a
general power which the donee exercised by will, where the power, was
exercised in favor of the takers in default of appointment, who renounced
under the will of the donee of the power and took under the default
clause. The Court said that the property did not "pass" under the
exercise of the power.
There was, of course, no gift tax in 1918. Prior to 1942 the gift tax
made no mention of powers of appointment. The Treasury ruled that
" The rules about the type of power of appointment which must be given to a
surviving spouse to qualify a trust for the marital deduction have not been changed
by the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951.
"' In the typical settlement where half of an estate is left to a surviving spouse
under a marital deduction trust to take full advantage of the marital deduction, and
the other half is tied up under a trust where the surviving spouse gets a life estate
with remainders to the children, in order to avoid a "second tax," the possibility of
introducing greater flexibility in the second trust by employing nontaxable powers
of appointment might well be considered.12 Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951).
" 39 StAr. 756 (1916).14255 U. S. 257 (1921).
1 40 STAT. 1057 (1919).
11056 STAT. 798 (1942).
127294 U. S. 153 (1935).
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the inter viros exercise of a general power of appointment was taxable
as a gift before 1942,18 a position which seems questionable in view of
the decision in United States v. Field,19 and the fact that when the
donee of a power of appointment exercises the power, title to the ap-
pointed property passes from the donor of the power to the appointee,
rather than from the donee to the appointee.
In 1942 Congress adopted a new approach to the taxation of powers
of appointment. For some time there had been increasing criticism of
the method of taxing powers of appointment instituted by the 1918 Act.
In 1939 Dean Griswold published an article20 in which he contended
that the existing tax on powers of appointment was too limited because
it taxed only the exercise and not the non-exercise of powers of appoint-
ment and because the tax was limited to general powers. He also criti-
cized the requirement that property had to "pass" under the exercise of
the power of appointment. Griswold argued that the failure to exercise
a power of appointment was another method of exercising the power
and that the non-exercise as well as the exercise of powers should be
taxed, which would also eliminate any requirement that property "pass"
under the exercise of the power.2 1 He also felt that restricting the tax to
general powers of appointment was unsound because by creating a power,
such as a power limited to residents of the United States, a man could in
effect give the donee of the power what would for all practical purposes
be a general power, although it was taxed as a special power.2 2 Gris-
wold intimated that he would be satisfied to exempt certain limited family
powers, such as a power under which the donee might appoint property
to his children or descendants, but he felt that generally both the exer-
cise and the non-exercise of special as well as general powers should be
taxed.
Professor Leach dissented 23 from Dean Griswold's views. He con-
tended that if powers of appointment were taxed more extensively this
would not increase the revenue from the estate tax, because people would
" U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.2(b) (1943).
19255 U. S. 257 (1921).
" Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV L.
REv. 929 (1939).
1 Some of the difficulties which arose in connection with the rule laid down by
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935), that property must "pass" under the
exercise of the power appear in Rogers Estate v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 410
(1943).
" was not clear whether or not in order to have a general power under the
1918 Act the donee of the power had to be authorized to appoint to anyone in the
world, Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 929, 938-942 (1939). In Charles J. Hepburn, Ex'r, 37 B. T. A. 459 (1938) a
power which could only be exercised by the donee with the approval of a trustee
was held to be a special power. In Clausen v. Elizabeth R. Vaughan, Ex'r, 147 F.
2d 84 (1st Cir. 1945) a power to anyone except one person or her family or assigns
was held to be a special power.
"3Leach, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A DiSSENT, 52
HARV. L. Ray. 961 (1939).
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dispose of their property by creating successive estates in order to avoid
a second tax upon the death of the first beneficiary, without using powers
of appointment. The result would simply be unwise and inflexible settle-
ments without any offsetting tax advantages. Dean Griswold filed a
reply to Professor Leach's dissent,24 and Professor Leach came back
with a rejoinder,25 both of which added more heat than light to the con-
troversy.
The argument between Griswold and Leach takes on added signifi-
cance in view of subsequent developments. In 1942 a new system of
taxing powers of appointment was adopted which paralleled very closely
the suggestions which Dean Griswold made in his article. It seems,
however, that Professor Leach may ultimately have the last word here
just as he did in the original controversy, since the 1951 legislation re-
peals most of the 1942 ideas about taxing powers of appointment and
vindicates the position which Leach espoused initially.
Under the 1942 Act,2 6 the exercise or release of a general or a spe-
cial power of appointment by will, or by a transfer in contemplation of,
or taking effect at, death was taxed under the estate tax. Moreover,
the non-exercise of either a general or special power was subject to the
tax, provided the power was in existence at the donee's death. The 1942
Act expressly exempted powers under which the donee could only ap-
point to members of his immediate family or that of the donor of the
power27 or to a charity, and powers which could only be exercised by a
disinterested fiduciary in favor of a restricted class of persons. How-
ever, these powers were taxed if they were exercised to create a second
power, even an exempt power.
The estate tax amendments to the 1942 Act, which was enacted on
October 21, 1942, applied to estates of decedents 'dying after the date of
enactment of the Act.2 8  However, an attempt was made to avoid a
retroactive tax on powers created prior to October 22, 1942, by provid-
24 Griswold, In Reply, 52 HARv. L. REv. 967 (1939).
"Leach, Rejoinder, 52 HAv. L. REv. 968 (1939).20 Revenue Act of 1942, §403, 56 STAT. 942 (1942).
* Section 403 of the 1942 Act provided that a power should not be taxable if
the donee could only appoint "within a class which does not include any others
than the spouse of the decedent, spouse of the creator of the power, descendants of
the decedent or his spouse, descendants (other than the decedent) of the creator of
the power or his spouse, spouses of such descendants," and charities. Although it
seems pretty clear that Congress intended to treat any power under which the donee
could appoint to himself as a taxable power, under a literal reading of the statute
it could be argued that if the donee of the power was a spouse of the donor of
the power and had power to appoint only to himself or herself, this would be
an exempt power. In Schwab v. Allen, 78 F. Supp. 234 (M. D. Ga. 1948) the
court held that a power to invade the corpus of a trust was not a taxable power
when the beneficiary possessing the power was the spouse of the creator of the trust.
If this decision was sound it seems to be the only situation where a power which
was exempt under the 1942 Act will be taxable under the Powers of Appointment
Act of 1951.2 Revenue Act of 1942, §401, 56 STAT. 941 (1942).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing that such powers should not be taxed, if the donee of the power
could not appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of
his estate, unless the power was exercisd. 29 Moreover, in the case of
other powers created prior to October 22, 1942, no tax was imposed if
the donee of the power released the power or reduced it to an exempt
power prior to a prescribed date,3 0 which was finally extended to July 1,
1951,31 or died before the prescribed date without exercising the power.
It was also provided that a donee under a disability at the time the 1942
Act was adopted could release or reduce a pre-existing power within six
months of the removal of the disability without incurring any tax, and
would incur no tax if he died within that period without releasing the
power, provided he did not exercise the power.
32
At the same time at which Congress amended the provisions of the
estate tax taxing powers of appointment, it provided explicitly for the
first time for a tax on powers of appointment under the gift tax.33 The
gift tax provisions were keyed to the estate tax amendments. Both the
exercise and the release of either a general or a spcial power by the
donee of the power during his life were taxed. The same two powers
which were exempted from the estate tax were exempt under the gift
tax, with, however, the same exception about the exercise of a non-
taxable power to create a second power, which was taxable.
The gift tax amendments under the 1942 Act applied to gifts made
on or after January 1, 1943.34 However, no tax was imposed in the
case of a power created prior to October 22, 1942, where the donee of
the power could not appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors or the
creditors of his estate, unless he exercised the power. 35 In the case of
other powers created prior to October 22, 1942, the statute provided that
if the donee was under a disability at the time the 1942 Act was adopted,
he might release the power or reduce it to an exempt power at any time
within six months of the removal of the disability without incurring a
tax.36 The statute also provided that there should be no gift tax if a
power was released or reduced to a non-taxable power prior to January
1, 1943. 3 7 This privilege was not limited, expressly at least, to powers
created prior to October 22, 1942. When the prescribed date for releas-
ing or reducing powers without incurring any gift tax was subsequently
extended by successive amendments to July 1, 1951, 88 the statutory
- Revenue Act of 1942, §403(d) (1), 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
"Revenue Act of 1942, §403(d) (3), 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
Pub. L. No. 578, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1950).
2 Revenue Act of 1942, §403(d) (2), 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
"Revenue Act of 1942, §452, 56 STAT. 952 (1942).
'4 Revenue Act of 1942, §451, 56 STAT. 951 (1942).
"Revenue Act of 1942, §452(b) (1), 56 STAT. 952 (1942).
"Revenue Act of 1942, §452(b) (2), 56 STAT. 952 (1942).
"7 Revenue Act of 1942, §452(c) (3), 56 STAT. 952 (1942).
" Pub. L. No. 578, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1950).
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language did not restrict this privilege in the case of the gift tax, as it did
under the estate tax, to pre-existing powers, although the Regulations
did.89
The bar was never very happy about the provisions of the 1942 Act
taxing powers of appointment. It was pointed out with considerable
justification that the system of taxing powers of appointment initiated
by the 1942 Act did not increase the revenue from the estate and gift
taxes, since a "second tax" could still be avoided by creating successive
estates and confining powers of appointment to the two classes expressly
exempted under the 1942 Act, so that the only effect of the 1942 taxes
was to hinder desirable family settlements. Finally, due principally to
the efforts of the Taxation Section of the American Bar Association and
the Tax Committee of the American Bankers Association, the Powers
of Appointment Act of 195140 was passed, which, with some significant
exceptions, undertakes to restore as nearly as possible the situation which
existed prior to 1942.
B. The Powers of Appointment Act of 1951
Like most efforts to simplify the tax law, the Powers of Appoint-
ment Act of 1951 is a fairly intricate piece of legislation. However, the
basic plan of the new law is fairly obvious and keeping it in mind will
facilitate analysis of the finer details.
The new Act divides powers of appointment into powers created on
or before the date when the 1942 Act was enacted, or powers created
prior to October 22, 1942, which may be referred to as pre-existing
powers, and powers created after October 21, 1942, which may be desig-
nated as post-1942 powers. The reason that the date of enactment of
the 1942 Act rather than the time when the new law was passed is taken
as the critical date under the Powers of Appointment Act is that the
Powers of Appointment Act repeals the provisions of the 1942 Act
taxing powers of appointment retroactively. The new law operates as
though the 1942 Act had never been passed but the Powers of Appoint-
ment Act had been adopted in its stead.41 It appears possible to get
refunds for any taxes paid in connection with powers of appointment
which were taxable under the 1942 Act and are not taxable under the
1951 law. However, since the 1951 Act makes no provision for tolling
the statute of limitations or reopening closing agreements, any refunds
are apparently limited to years which are still open and are not barred
by the statute of limitations.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §862(b) (1943).Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951).
,The new law takes effect as of October 21, 1942, the date of enactment of the
1942 Act. It applies to estates of decedents dying after October 21, 1942 and to
gifts made after December 31, 1942, the effective dates of the 1942 Act. Pub. L.
No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §§2(c), and 3(c). (June 28, 1951).
19521
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As far as pre-existing powers are concerned, the new law tries to
restore the situation which existed prior to the 1942 Act. Only the
exercise of a pre-existing general power, which the new law defines as
a power under which the donee of the power can appoint the property
subject to the power to himself, his estate, his creditors or the creditors
of his estate, is taxed.
With regard to post-1942 powers the new law follows the law as it
stood prior to 1942 by limiting the tax to general powers of appointment.
However, in the case of post-1942 powers, both the exercise and the
non-exercise of the power are taxed.
This is the broad outline of the new law. Consider its imple-
mentation.
(1) Pre-Existing Powers
In the case of powers created prior to October 22, 1942, only the
exercise of a general power of appointment is taxed.
This means that under the estate tax only the exercise of a general
power of appointment by will, or by a transfer in contemplation of, or
taking effect at, death is taxed.42 The non-exercise or the release of a
pre-existing power is not taxed. Neither the exercise nor the non-exer-
cise of non-general powers are taxed.
As far as the gift tax is concerned only the inter vivos exercise of a
general power is taxed.43 The release of pre-existing powers of appoint-
ment is not taxed. Nor are non-general powers taxed.
The only significant difference between the treatment of pre-existing
powers under the new law and the taxation of powers of appointment
under the 1918 Act is that the requirement that property must "pass"
under the exercise of the power has been eliminated from the 1951 Act.
Thus, if the donee of a general power of appointment exercises the power
in favor of the person who would have taken in default of appointment,
there will be a tax, even though the appointee refuses to take under the
appointment and elects to take under the default clause.44
If either a pre-existing or a post-1942 general power is partially re-
leased so that it is reduced to a non-general power, no tax is incurred
upon the reduction. Moreover, if the reduced power was a pre-existing
power and it was partially released before November 1, 1951, or in the
case of a donee under a disability when the 1942 Act was passed, within
" Int. Rev. Code §811 (f) (1). The statute provides for a tax where the power
is exercised "by a disposition which is of such a nature that if it were a transfer of
property owned by the decedent, such property would be includible in the decedent's
gross estate under subsection (c) or (d)."
" INT. RiEv. CoDE §1000(c) (1).
"It was so held under the 1942 Act which also omitted any requirement of
"passing." Guaranty Trust Co. v. Johnson, 165 F. 2d 298 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Wilson




six months of the removal of the disability, no tax will be incurred upon
the later exercise of the power.45 The general idea here is that the re-
duction of a general power to a non-general power has no tax conse-
quences, since the donee of the power has not finally designated the per-
sons to finally take the property subject to the power and there is no
complete disposition of the property under either the gift 6 or estate
taxes.4 7 Ordinarily, if a pre-existing general power is partially released
so that it is reduced to a non-general power, a tax will be incurred upon
the further exercise of the power when the dtonee can no longer control
the disposition of the property subject to the power. However, since
under the 1942 Act it was possible to reduce a pre-existing power to an
exempt power and escape a tax upon the later exercise of the power, if
this was done before July 1, 1951, or within six months of the removal
of a disability in the case of a donee under a disability when the 1942 Act
was passed,48 this privilege is preserved under the 1951 Act with the fur-
ther extension of the tax-free release date to November 1, 1951.
(2) Post-1942 Powers
As far as powers created after October 21, 1942, are concerned only
general powers are taxed, with one exception which seems to have no
application to North Carolina. The one exception where a special power
is taxed is where such a power is exercised to create a second power
under which the vesting of the property subject to the power may be
suspended for a period ascertainable without reference to the date of the
creation of the first power.4 9 Apparently the only state where this can
be done is Delaware. 50 Apart from this exception only general powers
are taxed. However, both the exercise and the non-exercise of a general
post-1942 power are taxed.
This means that under the estate tax a tax will be imposed where a
general post-1942 power is exercised or released by a transfer in con-
templation of, or taking effect at, death; or where the power is in exist-
ence at the donee's death, whether or not it is exercised by will.51
As far as the gift tax is concerned both the inter vivos exercise and
release of a general post-1942 power are taxed, although the release of
such a power is only taxed where it occurs after May 31, 1951.52 The
reason that the statute permits the tax-free release of general powers
before June 1, 1951, under the gift tax is that such powers could be
released without incurring any gift tax under the 1942 Act before July
"'INT. Rav. CODE §811(f) (1) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (1) (gift tax).
"'Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
"Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933).
Revenue Act of 1942, §403, 452, 56 STAT. 942, 952 (1942), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 578, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1950).
,INT. REv. CODE §811 (f) (4) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (4) (gift tax).
coDE-L. Ray. CoDE c. 118, §4414 (1935).
INT. REv. CODE §811 (f) (2). "' INT. REv. CODE §1000(c) (2).
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1, 1951.53 It is not readily apparent why the date for the tax-free re-
lease of powers was moved back from July 1, 1951 to June 1, 1951. In
this connection it is perhaps worth noting that only the gift tax permits
the complete release of a post-1942 as well as a pre-existing power free
of tax before June 1, 1951. Under the prior law as it was literally writ-
ten both pre-existing and post-1942 powers of appointment could be
released without incurring a gift tax before July 1, 1951, although the
Treasury contended that this privilege did not extend to post-1942
powers,54 and under the estate tax the privilege of releasing powers of
appointment tax-free before July 1, 1951, was limited to pre-existing
powers. The new Act permits the complete release of both pre-existing
and post-1942 powers before June 1, 1951, without any gift tax. How-
ever, there is no similar privilege in connection with the estate tax.
Consequently, if a post-1942 power were released by a transfer in con-
templation of, or taking effect at, death before June 1, 1951, there would
be no gift tax, but there would be an estate tax.
The reduction of a post-1942 general power to a non-taxable power
has no tax consequences under either the estate or the gift tax.55 When,
however, the reduced power is later exercised or released so that the
donee can no longer dictate who takes the property subject to the power,
or if the reduced power is still in existence at the donee's death, there
will be a tax. The Committee Report56 said that where a post-1942
power is reduced to a non-taxable power before June 1, 1951, it may
be later exercised or released without incurring any gift tax. There is
no direct statutory language to support this conclusion. Apparently it
represents an inference from the provision authorizing a complete release
of such a power without incurring any gift tax before June 1, 1951.5
7
(3) Date of Creation of Powers
The rules for determining whether a power is a pre-existing or a
post-1942 power are somewhat artificial. A power created by deed is
treated as a pre-existing power if the deed took effect prior to October
22, 1942. A power created by will is a pre-existing power if the testator
who created the power died before October 22, 1942, so that the will
took effect and the power was created before that date. However, a
power created by will is also regarded as a pre-existing power, if it was
created under a will which was executed on or before October 21, 1942,
"Revenue Act of 1942, §452(c) (3), 56 STAT. 952 (1942), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 578, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1950).
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §862(b) (1943).
SEN. REP. No. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951).
SSupra, note 55.
There will, however, be an estate tax if the reduced power is later exercised
by a transfer in contemplation of, or taking effect at death, since there is no pro-




and was never republished after that date, provided the testator died
before July 1, 1949. 51 Any other power is treated as a post-1942 power.
(4) General and Special Powers
Since, with the one exception previously adverted to,5 9 the statute
taxes only general powers, it is important to distinguish between general
powers and what may be called special powers, although non-general
powers would be a more accurate designation. With certain qualifica-
tions, the statute defines a general power as a power where the donee can
appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his es-
tate. 0o He need not be empowered to appoint to all four of these objects.
If he can appoint to any one of them, the power is general. Any other
power is a special or non-general power.
There are certain powers, however, which are not treated as general
powers although the donee of the power can appoint to himself, his
estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate.
Thus, in the case of either a pre-existing or a post-1942 power, a
power under which the donee of the power can invade or consume prop-
erty which is limited by an ascertainable standard related to the health,
education, support or maintainance of the donee is not regarded as a
general power.0 ' For example, a power under which the income bene-
ficiary of a trust can withdraw principal from the trust to the extent
needed for his support in his accustomed manner of living would not be
a general power. Although if the power were limited by some less
ascertaintable standard such as his "comfort" or "happiness" it would be
taxable.0 2 In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that in the case
of pre-existing powers the statutory provision exempting powers of in-
vasion limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the donee's health,
education, support or maintainance is scarcely significant. Even an
unlimited power of invasion in the case of a pre-existing power would
not be taxable, since there would be no gift tax if the donee exercised
the power, because a man cannot make a taxable gift to himself, nor
would there be any gift or estate tax if the donee failed to exercise or
released the power, since only the exercise of a pre-existing power is
taxable.
A pre-existing power which the donee of the power can exercise only
with the consent of some other person is not treated as a taxable power,
" Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §§2(b), 3(b) (June 28, 1951).
"' Supra p. 235.00 INT. REv. CODE §811(f) (3) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (3) (gift tax).
"INT. REv. CODE §811 (f) (3) (A) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (3) (A) (gift tax).
02 The cases raising the question of whether a remainder to a charity after a life
estate to a beneficiary who has a power to invade corpus is deductible seem to be
in point. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929) ; Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256 (1943); Henslee v. Union Planters
Bank, 355 U. S. 595 (1949).
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although the donee could exercise the power in favor of himself.08 The
"other person" need not be a person having any substantial adverse in-
terest in the power.
A post-1942 power will be treated as a general power, however, if
the donee can exercise the power in favor of himself, his estate, his credi-
tors or the creditors of his estate, even though the -donee can only exer-
cise the power with the consent of some other person, unless the other
person is the donor of the power or a person having a substantial adverse
interest in the power. A power which can only be exercised by the donee
in conjunction with the donor of the power or a person having a substan-
tial adverse interest in the power is not a general power.6 4 Is is not par-
ticularly clear what a substantial adverse interest is. The statute provides
that a person who may appoint the property subject to the power of ap-
pointment in his own favor after the death of the donee of the power, is
a person who has a substantial adverse interest in the property.0 5 The
Committee Reports66 add that the taker in default of appointment also
has a substantial adverse interest, and for further guidance as to what
is a substantial adverse interest refer to the cases dealing with this prob-
lem under the gift and income taxes, which shows, perhaps, a rather
naive faith in the predictability of those cases.
If the only interest which the person who must join with the donee
in the exercise of the power has in the power is the fact that the property
might be appointed to him, he has not a substantial adverse interest in
the power. However, in this case the statute provides that only a frac-
tion of the property subject to the power equal to the value of the prop-
erty divided by a number made up of the donee and the number of
persons to whom the property might be appointed and who must concur
in the exercise of the power shall be taxed.6T For example, if A is given
power to appoint Blackacre to anyone whom he chooses with the con-
sent of B and C, and with their consent A appoints the property to X,
only one-third of the value of Blackacre is taxed.
(5) Lapsed Powers
Under the 1942 Act there was considerable controversy about whether
the lapse of a power could be taxed as a release of the power. For
example, suppose that C is the income beneficiary of a trust and that he
has a non-cumulative power to withdraw $10,000 a year from the princi-
"*INT. REv. CODE §811(f) (3) (B) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (3) (B) (gift
tax).
"' INT. REv. CODE §811 (f) (3) (C) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (3) (C) (gift tax).
"INT. REv. CODE §811(f) (3) (C)ii (estate tax) and §1000(c) (3) (C)ii (gift
tax).
" H. R. REP. No. 327, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951) ; SEx. REP. No. 382, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951).




pal of the trust. C does not make any withdrawals and after several years
dies. The Treasury argued under the 1942 Act that the lapse of the
power to withdraw $10,000 a year was a release of the power which was
taxable as a gift and that the aggregate amount which could have been
withdrawn during the donee's life under the lapsed powers was taxable
to his estate under the estate tax as a release of the powers by way of a
transfer taking effect at death.
Under the new law it does not matter as far as pre-existing powers
are concerned whether the lapse of a power is a release of the power or
not, because the release of pre-existing powers is not taxed. However,
the 1951 Act expressly provides that the lapse of a post-1942 power is
a relase of the power, although this is qualified by providing that it is
only taxable to the extent that the property which could have been ap-
pointed under the lapsed power exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 5 per
cent of the value of the aggregate assets out of which the power could
have been satisfied at the time the lapse occurred.68 The purpose of the
provision is to tax lapses of post-1942 powers with an exception which
will permit a moderate amount of principal to be withdrawn from a trust
each year without incurring a tax. For example, suppose that C is the
income beneficiary of a trust, which was created in 1951, under which he
is given a non-cumulative power to withdraw up to $20,000 a year of the
principal of the trust each year. Suppose further that in 1951 C does
not withdraw anything and the value of the trust at the end of the year
is $200,000; and that in 1952 C makes no withdrawals and dies when
the value of the trust is $300,000; and finally that his executor elects to
value C's estate for purposes of the federal estate tax as of the date of
C's death. In this case C made a taxable gift of $10,000, discounted for
his life expectancy in the income from this amount, in 1951, because
the property subject to the power of withdrawal, which lapsed in 1951,
exceeded 5 per cent of the value of the trust fund ($10,000) at the end
of the year, when the power lapsed, by this amount. C is not, of course,
taxed on a gift of the full $10,000 because, since he retained the income
from this amount, he did not give away a full $10,000. As far as the
federal estate tax is concerned C will be taxed on $35,000 because of his
interest in the trust, which is made up as follows: He will be taxed on
$20,000 because he had a power to withdraw $20,000 from the trust fund
at his death. The full amount which C could have withdrawn in 1952
is taxed to his estate, instead of the excess of $20,000 over 5 per cent of
the trust fund, since the tax is imposed on the basis of a general power
which was in existence at the donee's death, rather than a lapsed power.
C's estate is taxed on an additional $15,000 because of the lapse of the
power in 1951. This is taxable under the estate tax as a release of the
" INT. REv. CoDE §811(f) (5) (estate tax) and §1000(c) (5) (gift tax).
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power by way of a transfer taking effect at death, because C retained the
right to the income during his life from the property subject to the power.
The reason that $15,000 rather than $10,000 is taxed is that the amount
which is taxed because of the lapse of the power under the estate tax
based on the value of the property, not at the time the power lapses, but
at the time of the donee's death, or one year after his death, if the optional
valuation date is used. The simplest way to determine this amount is
to take a fraction of the trust fund at death, or one year after death, if
the optional valuation 'date is used, which has for its numerator the
amount by which the property subject to the lapsed power exceeded the
greater of $5,000 or 5 per cent of the trust fund at the time of the lapse,
and its denominator the value of the trust fund at the time of the lapse.
Thus, in the hypothetical case the amount by which the property subject
to the lapsed power exceeded 5 per cent of the trust fund at the time the
power lapsed was $10,000 and the value of the trust fund at that time
was $200,000. Since the value of the trust fund at the time of the 'donee's
death was $300,000 one-twentieth of this amount or $15,000 will be
taxed to his estate because of the power which lapsed in 1951.
(6) Renunciation
Although the release of a post-1942 power is taxed under the 1951
Act, it is expressly provided that a disclaimer or renunciation of a power
of appointment is not taxable either under the estate tax69 or the gift
tax.70 Ordinarily a power must be disclaimed or renounced promptly
when the donee learns of the power. If the power is once accepted, the
only way to get rid of it is by a release which is taxable.
Tax Planning Under the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951
The purpose of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 is to en-
courage the use of powers of appointment by freeing a number of powers
from the federal estate and gift taxes. Consequently, the new law offers
the estate planner a number of interesting opportunities for tax econo-
mies. Without attempting to explore all of the tax-saving opportunities
which are opened up by the 1951 Act, some of the more obvious ways
to avoid taxes under the new law may be noted briefly.
In general there are two ways to save taxes in connection with powers
of appointment. One method is to use nontaxable powers instead of
taxable powers in creating future powers of appointment. The other
is to take whatever steps the law allows to minimize taxes on existing
powers.
A. Planning Future Powers
The choice of the kind of power of appointment to be embodied in
an estate plan should not be determined primarily by tax considerations,
11 IxN. REv. CODE §811(f) (2). '70 IxT. REv. CODE §1000(c) (2).
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and a particular power should not be selected solely because it is not
taxable. However, where a nontaxable power will achieve the same re-
sult as a taxable power it is obvious common sense to use the nontaxable
power.. In the typical family settlement a power of appointment is
usually employed for one of two purposes: (1) to give the donee of the
power power to dispose of the property subject to the power to someone
else; or (2) to give the donee of the power power to acquire the property
for himself. The 1951 Act offers a variety of nontaxable powers by
which it is usually possible to achieve either of these ends without incur-
ring a tax.
For example, suppose that a man wishes to leave his property to his
wife or child for life with a power of appointment over the remainder.
Ordinarily the donor of the power will have some definite class of persons
in mind to whom he wishes the remainder to be appointed such as his
children or grandchildren or their spouses or some member of his family.
By phrasing the power in terms of the donor's actual intentions and
limiting the power of appointment explicitly to the classes of appointees
he has in mind, it is possible to carry out his wishes just as completely
as though the donee were given a general power. In fact his intentions
may usually be carried out more accurately by a power of this kind, since
it insures against the donee appointing the property to someone outside
the family whom the donor of the power would not want to take the
property.
It may be possible to create a nontaxable power by phrasing the power
in the words of the statute and giving the donee power to appoint to
anyone in the world except the donee himself, his estate, his creditors
or the creditors of his estate. There is authority to the effect, however,
that if the donee of such a power exercises the power his creditors may
reach the appointed property,71 which makes it a little hard to distinguish
such a power from a power which the donee can exercise in favor of his
creditors. Apparently the Commissioner has ruled informally that such
a power is a nontaxable power.72 Until the matter is definitely settled,
however, it seems wiser to phrase a power which you want to be non-
taxable in terms which limit the exercise of the power to definite classes
other than the donee, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his
estate.
An interesting question arises as to whether or not what is sometimes
called a "reverse" power is a general power. For example, suppose that
a person is given power to appoint property to-a definite class of persons
which excludes himself, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his
estate, is this a general power because the donee or his estate will benefit
"1 State Street Trust Co. v. Kissell, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N. E. 2d 25 (1939), noted
in 52 HARv. L. REv. 1019 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §329, comment c (1940).
" See Johnson, Powers of Appointment, 29 TAXES 965 at 970 (1951).
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from the failure to exercise the power? More specifically, suppose that
C is the income beneficiary of a trust who has power to appoint the prin-
cipal from the trust outright and free from the trust to his children
during his life. During his life C appoints the trust property to his son
John. The sensible way to view this situation and apparently the way in
which Congress intended for it to be viewed 73 is to regard the power as
a special power which is not taxable and to treat C as having made a
gift only of his life estate. In other words, powers of appointment are
'confined to powers to appoint property which the donee of the property
does not own. In the hypothetical case C owned a life estate in the trust
property and he also had a special power to appoint the remainder in
the trust property. When he exercised the power he appointed the re-
mainder over which he had a power of appointment and he also conveyed
his life estate in the trust, which was quite separate and distinct from
the power. The exercise of the power is not taxable, but the conveyance
of his life estate is.7 4 Consequently, a power to appoint property to a
class of persons which does not include the donee, his estate, his credi-
tors or the creditors of his estate seems to be a special nontaxable
power, although the donee may benefit incidentally by the failure to
exercise the power. If, in exercising the power, the donee conveys some
other interest which he owns, he should be taxed only upon the transfer
of this interest. However, the property subject to the power should not
be taxed. Moreover, if the interest which the donee owns in the property
is so remote or speculative that it cannot be valued there should be no
tax even on the transfer of this interest. For example, suppose that X
is a contingent remainderman under a trust, who has a remote interest
too speculative.for valuation, and X also has a power to appoint principal
from the trust to the income beneficiary. X exercises this power by 'deed
during his life. He should not incur a gift tax. The power is a nontax-
able power. The interest which he has transferred in the trust is too
tenuous to be susceptible of valuation for purposes of the gift tax.
It is, of course, conceivable that the donee of a special power might
be regarded as possessing a general power because the failure to exercise
the power might result in some benefit to the donee. For example, in
the situation where an income beneficiary of a trust has power to ap-
point principal from the trust outright and he does so during his life by
deed, it might be argued that he had exercised a general power and that
" See Turk, New Rides on Powers of Appointment, 90 TRUST & ESTATES, 428
at 430, 482 (1951).
"' The Committee Reports provide: "The provisions relating specifically to
powers of appointment, which are proposed to be inserted in the Internal Revenue
Code by this bill, are not intended to limit the scope of other subdivisions of the
Code (such as subsections (a), (c), and (d) of Section 811 and subsection (a)
of Section 1000) which apply to the transfer at death or during life of any interest
in property possessed by the taxpayer." H. R. REP. No. 327, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1951); SEN. REP. No. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1951).
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he was, therefore, subject to a gift tax not merely upon the value of the
life estate which he had transferred, but upon the entire property. Al-
though this seems untenable it is not an impossible point of view, and
it may be well, therefore, to exercise caution in giving nontaxable powers
to a donee who will benefit from the failure to exercise the power.
It is not clear to what extent a contingent power will be treated as a
taxable power, if the contingency does not occur. The statute provides
that a power of appointment "shall be considered to exist on the date of
the decedent's death even though the exercise of the power is subject to a
precedent giving of notice or even though the exercise of the power takes
effect only on the expiration of a stated period after its exercise, whether
or not on or before the date of the decedent's 'death notice has been given
or the power has been exercised. '7 5 It seems clear under this language
that a power which the donee could exercise in his favor will be treated
as existing at the donee's death and taxable, even though the power
could only be exercised upon giving a certain notice which had not been
given at the donee's death. It is arguable that since the statute specifies
that this type of condition shall not prevent a power from being treated
as in existence, any other contingency which had not occurred at the
donee's death should prevent the power from being treated as existing
at the donee's death. For example, if C is given power to appoint prin-
cipal from a trust fund if he is married and he dies unmarried, it could
be argued that the property subject to the power was not taxable to C's
estate under the federal estate tax since C had nof married and the condi-
tion necessary to bring the power into existence had not happened at
C's death. The language in section 811(f) (2) which provides that a
power of appointment shall be deemed to be in existence although it is
subject to giving notice which has not been given appears to have been
copied from the language in Section 811 (d) (3) where there is a similar
provision with respect to when a power to alter, amend, revoke or ter-
minate a trust shall be deemed to exist. According to the Regulations
in the case of revocable transfers, the mention of one kind of condition
in the statute which does not prevent the power to alter, amend, revoke
or terminate a trust from existing 'does not mean that powers based upon
other contingencies are not in existence,7 6 although there are decisions
to the contrary. 77 Presumably the Treasury will adopt a similar attitude
with respect to powers of appointment and will hold that contingent
powers are in existence and taxable. Possibly there will be the same dis-
sent upon the part of the courts. Until the matter is definitely settled,
however, it would be unwise to assume that a contingent power of ap-
pointment will not be taxed.
" INT. REv. CODE §811(f) (2).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.20(b) (1943).
""Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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-The statute offers several methods for creating a nontaxable power
by which the donee of the power can acquire the property subject to the
power. Thus, for example, the beneficiary of a trust can be given a
power to withdraw the principal from a trust which will not be taxable
if the power is limited by some ascertainable standand related to the
health, education, support or maintainance of the beneficiary. If the
creator of the trust does not wish to limit the beneficiary's power to
withdraw principal by some ascertainable standard, he can give the
beneficiary a nontaxable power to invade the trust fund in the form of
a non-cumulative power to make annual withdrawals not in excess of
the greater of $5,000 or 5 per cent of the value of the trust fund at the
end of the year. Since the amount which the beneficiary can withdraw
free of tax is apparently determined by the number of trusts in connec-
tion with which this privilege is granted, it would appear possible to in-
crease the amount which the beneficiary can withdraw tax-free by creat-
ing multiple trusts. For example, the maximum amount which the
beneficiary could be empowered to withdraw from a single trust fund
of $100,000 would be $5,000 a year. However, there appears to be no
reason why two trust funds of $50,000 each could not be created and
the beneficiary authorized to withdraw $5,000 a year from each trust,
for a total of $10,000.
If the creator of the trust wishes to give still broader powers of with-
drawing principal from the trust this can be done by giving the trustee
unlimited -discretion to pay over principal to a beneficiary.7s There
seems to be no reason, moreover, why several of these tax-free powers
cannot be combined without incurring any tax. For example, the crea-
tor of a trust might give the beneficiary power to withdraw $5,000 a year
from the principal of the trust and any additional amounts of principal
which he may need for his support in his accustomed manner of living,
without creating a taxable power.
One way to create a nontaxable power of appointment is to create
a joint power which can only be exercised bythe holder of the power in
conjunction with the donor of the power or a person having a substantial
adverse interest in the power. If the power could only be exercised in
conjunction with the donor of the power, this would, however, usually
make the property subject to the power taxable to the estate of the donor
of the power.79 It seems -doubtful whether joint powers will be employed
to any great extent to avoid taxes except in unusual situations.
" If the trustee has an unfettered discretion about making payments to the bene-
ficiary this would clearly appear to be a nontaxable power since the donee of the
power, who is the trustee, cannot exercise the power in favor of himself, his estate,
his creditors or the creditors of the estate. Care should be observed to make sure
that the beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to make payments to him. Otherwise
the power might be construed as a general power vested in the beneficiary.
' INT. REV. CoDE §811(d).
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B. Avoiding Taxes on Existing Powers
The new law offers more favorable opportunities for avoiding taxes
on pre-existing powers than it does for avoiding taxes upon powers
created after the 1942 Act. It may be well, therefore, to consider the
two situations separately.
(1) Pre-Existing Powers
Ordinarily, the best way to avoid a tax upon a pre-existing general
power is not to exercise the power, since only the exercise and not the
non-exercise of such powers are taxed. If the power of appointment is
one which can be exercised by will care should be taken to avoid an
inadvertent exercise of the power. In many states, including North
Carolina8 ° a general residuary bequest or 'devise exercises a power of
appointment unless a contrary intention appears in the will. If, there-
fore, the donee of a power of appointment exercisable by will does not
intend to exercise the power, an explicit statement to that effect should
be inserted in his will.
If the beneficiary of a trust has a pre-existing power to withdraw prin-
cipal from the trust the power will not be taxable even though it is an
unlimited power. If the beneficiary exercises the power, there will be
no tax because a man cannot make a taxable gift to himself. If he re-
leases the power or lets it remain unexercised until his death, there will
be no tax because only the exercise of a pre-existing power is taxed.
It would probably be wiser in this situation not to exercise the power if
the beneficiary actually does not need the principal. By exercising the
power he would draw that amount of principal into his estate, and, unless
he 'disposed of the principal during his life, increase his estate tax to that
extent. On the other hand, by refraining from exercising the power, he
can retain the privilege of reaching the property subject to the power at
any time he wishes and avoid any tax at his death.
A tax on a pre-existing general power can be avoided by releasing
the power. It is difficult to see any reason for doing this, however,
unless the donee is afraid of his own improvidence, or fears that he may
exercise the power inadvertently, since the retention of the power with-
out exercising it is not taxable.
Pre-existing non-general powers are not taxable, so no steps need be
taken to avoid a tax in connection with them. Thus, for example, if
there is a pre-existing power under which the beneficiary of a trust could
appoint the trust property with the consent of the trustee of the trust,
the power can safely be left alone. It will not be taxed if it is exercisedi
or not exercised.
Most wills which were drawn while the 1942 Act was in effect which
included powers of appointment were careful to phrase such powers in
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-43 (1950).
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terms of one of the two powers which were exempt under the 1942 Act.
81
With one possible exception the powers which were not taxable under
the 1942 law are not taxable under the Powers of Appointment Act, so
there is no need to redraft any such will, unless the draftsman wishes to
broaden the powers which it contains to take advantage of the new law.
Under the literal language of the 1942 Act a power under which the
donee of the power could appoint to himself was an exempt power, if
the 'donee was a spouse of the donor of the power. For example, if a
man died and left property in trust for his wife for life and gave the wife
a power to withdraw principal from the trust this would under a literal
reading of the 1942 Act have been an exempt power. It is very doubt-
ful whether such a power actually was exempt under the 1942 Act, al-
though there was one rather casual decision which held that it was.
8 2
It is clear that such a power would be taxable under the present law.
If, therefore, such a power were put in a will on the theory that it was
not taxable, it would be well to revise it now, if the will is still open to
revision.
If a general pre-existing power was reduced to a non-taxable power
prior to November 1, 1951, no tax will be incurred upon the exercise
of the power. However, if the partial release consisted of providing that
the donee of the power should be able to appoint to anyone except him-
self, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate, it is possible
that the power was not actually reduced to a nontaxable power. If the
donee exercises the power, in some states, at least, his creditors may be
able to reach the property subject to the power, 3 so that it can be argued
that the power may still be exercised in favor of the donee's creditors.
Probably since the release of the power followed the literal words of the
statute it will ultimately be held that the reduction of the power to a
nontaxable power was effective. However until this is decided definitely,
it might be wiser to refrain from exercising a power which has been re-
duced in this fashion, since it seems clear that the non-exercise even of
a general pre-existing power is not taxable.
(2) Post-1942 Powers
It is more difficult to escape a tax on a post-1942 power than it is
on a pre-existing power. The statute provides that there will be no tax
if the donee of the power renounces or disclaims the power. However,
prompt action is usually required to renounce a power, and after the
power has once been accepted the only way to get rid of it is by exer-
cising or releasing the power, which is taxable unless the release occurred
81 Stpra, p. 231.
2 Schwab v. Allen, 78 F. Supp. 234 (M. D. Ga. 1948). See note 27 supra.
33 Supra note 71.
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before June 1, 1951. Moreover, even in the case of a release prior to
June 1, 1951 this will only avoid a gift tax and not an estate tax.
A possible way of minimizing a tax on a post-1942 power which can
be exercised by deed as well as by will, is to exercise the power during
the donee's life in order to incur a gift tax instead of an estate tax, since
the gift tax is usually lower than the estate tax. In attempting this, how-
ever, care should be taken to avoid incurring both taxes. For example,
suppose that the income beneficiary of a trust has power to appoint the
remainder in the trust either by will or by deed and he exercises the
power to appoint the remainder during his life to escape an estate tax.
Unless the donee also transfers his life estate, this will be treated as an
exercise of the power of appointment by way of a transfer taking effect
at death, since the donee retained a life estate in the appointed property
during his life. Even if the donee gave up his life estate during his life
it is still possible that the exercise of the power of appointment would
be taxed under the estate tax on the theory of a transfer in contemplation
of death.
